近日，浙江大学中国农村发展研究院国际院长陈志钢教授团队博士生洪海与安徽大学黄永斌讲师合作撰写的学术论文“Order! the border: Multitasking, air pollution regulation and local government responses”在Journal of Environmental Economics and Management期刊发表。Journal of Environmental Economics and Management是环境经济学领域的顶级期刊，刊发具有重要政策相关性的原创理论与应用研究成果，期刊聚焦于探讨与自然资源和环境相关的经济问题。

中文介绍

本文提供了新的证据表明地方政府对自上而下的环境法规做出的策略性反应如何会诱发边界地区的环境污染问题。我们以中国实施《大气污染防治行动计划》为准实验，利用双重差分模型，发现该政策诱发了大气污染的边界效应。我们进一步揭示了地方政府在环境保护中显现出的“粉饰”行为。本文的结果表明，边界地区的空气污染会随着中央督察的来临而出现显著但短暂的降低，而在督察结束后重新加剧。这些结果主要是由于官员的晋升激励以及边界地区监管不完善所导致的。这引发了地方官员在非边界地区实施更为严格的环境监管，而在边界地区的监管力度则随着中央政策力度的变化而变化，从而满足经济增长和空气质量目标的多重任务。

英文摘要

This paper presents new evidence on how multitasking local governments’ strategic responses to top-down environmental regulations can induce pollution in border areas. Using the implementation of the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Action Plan in China as a quasi-experiment, we exploit a difference-in differences model and find that this policy induces the border effect of air pollution. We further reveal a salient window dressing behavior of local governments, which air pollution in border counties reduces significantly as the high-stakes inspection time neared, followed by a dramatic increase soon after the inspection. These results are driven by local government responses to incomprehensive air quality monitor stations installed in non-border counties, and local officials with strong promotion incentives, who exert strict regulations in non-border counties while varied regulations in border counties over time to cater for the multitasking of economic growth and air quality targets.