【Article title】 Contractal Arrangements and Enforcement in Transition Agriculture: theory and evidence from China
【Authors】 Hongdong Guo ,*, Robert W. Jolly
【作者单位】 Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province 310029, PR China
Department of Economics, Iowa State University, Ames, IA 50011, USA
【文献出处】 Food Policy,33(2008),570-575 jolly,SSCI/SCI 收录期刊
【Keywords】 Contract enforcement Transition agriculture
China
【Abstract】 This paper empirically investigates the relationship between contractual arrangements and their enforcement
in Chinese agriculture. Based on an analysis of a survey of 100 agribusiness firms engaged in contract
farming in Zhejiang province of China, we find that private contract enforcement mechanisms play
an important role in influencing smallholders’ decisions to breach or fulfill contracts. Contract arrangements
such as floor pricing, or requiring smallholders to make specific investments facilitate self-enforcement
and significantly improve the smallholder’s contract fulfillment rate. This is particularly important
in Chinese agriculture since the business environment is characterized by an absence of effective public
enforcement institutions.
Crown Copyright 2008 Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
【Authors】 Hongdong Guo ,*, Robert W. Jolly
【作者单位】 Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province 310029, PR China
Department of Economics, Iowa State University, Ames, IA 50011, USA
【文献出处】 Food Policy,33(2008),570-575 jolly,SSCI/SCI 收录期刊
【Keywords】 Contract enforcement Transition agriculture
China
【Abstract】 This paper empirically investigates the relationship between contractual arrangements and their enforcement
in Chinese agriculture. Based on an analysis of a survey of 100 agribusiness firms engaged in contract
farming in Zhejiang province of China, we find that private contract enforcement mechanisms play
an important role in influencing smallholders’ decisions to breach or fulfill contracts. Contract arrangements
such as floor pricing, or requiring smallholders to make specific investments facilitate self-enforcement
and significantly improve the smallholder’s contract fulfillment rate. This is particularly important
in Chinese agriculture since the business environment is characterized by an absence of effective public
enforcement institutions.
Crown Copyright 2008 Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
