【英文篇名】 Farmers' Voluntary Provision of Public Goods in Rural Communities——Analysis Based on the Theory of Reputation
【作者】 符加林; 崔浩; 黄晓红;
【英文作者】 FU Jia-lin1; CUI Hao2; HUANG Xiao-hong1（1.School of Management; Zhejiang University; Hangzhou 310027; China; 2.School of Law; Hangzhou 310028; China）;
【作者单位】 浙江大学管理学院; 浙江大学法学院; 浙江杭州;
【刊名】 经济经纬 , Economic Survey, 编辑部邮箱 2007年 04期
期刊荣誉：中文核心期刊要目总览 ASPT来源刊 CJFD收录刊
【关键词】 声誉; 农户; 农村社区; 公共物品; 均衡;
【英文关键词】 reputation; farmers; rural community; public goods; equilibrium;
【摘要】 农户的声誉不仅能给农户带来直接效用,它还具备信息效应与资本效应,对农户参与农村社区公共物品供给博弈的均衡路径产生重要影响。在独立博弈下,声誉的直接效用能使农户采取合作行动;在关联博弈和重复博弈中,声誉的信息及资本效应对农户的偷懒行为有很强的约束,将导致博弈进入合作均衡。因此基于声誉损益的考虑,由农户自愿供给农村社区内的公共物品会是一个有效的结果。
【英文摘要】 Farmers' reputation may produce not only direct utility,but also information effect and capital effect,and this will significantly affect the equilibrium path for farmers to take part in the game of providing public goods in rural community.The direct utility from reputation can make the farmers cooperate in the sole game.At the same time,the reputation information and capital effect have strong restriction to farmers' non-cooperation in the associated and repeated games,and this helps to obtain a cooperati...
【基金】 2006年浙江省社科规划重大招标课题(06ZDB05ZD)
【DOI】 CNKI:SUN:JJJW.0.2007-04-029